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"If I'm confirmed, I'll be myself," stated then Supreme Court nominee Samuel
1

Alito at his confirmation hearings on January 11, 2006. The conservative justice would
stay true to his word while serving as the 11 Oth Supreme Court Justice since January 31,
2006.
This paper will detail the life of Samuel Alito, the New Jersey born lawyer whose
dream was to someday become a Supreme Court Justice. Further, this paper will provide
a description of Justice Alito's jurisprudential, approach, as well as an analysis of ten of
i

his opinions covering a variety of topics. Finally, I will discuss my view on how Justice
Alito's background and jurisprudential approach have influenced those opinions since
joining the Court.

Biography of Justice Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr.
Justice Alito was born in Trenton, New Jersey on April 1, 1950 to Samuel and
Rose Alito, both of whom were schoolteachers. Justice Alito was raised in Hamilton
Township, New Jersey, near Trenton, where he attended Steiner High School. After high
school, Justice Alito went on to obtain an undergraduate degree from Princeton
University _2 During his time at Princeton, Justice Alito became involved with the
American Whig-Cliosophic Society, leading a Debate Panel on various issues such as the
decriminalization of sodomy and the ending of discrimination in hiring practices. 3 Justice

1

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1556319/posts.
Alito Called 'Perfect' Student, The Washington Times (December 13, 2005)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/dec/13/20051213-123632-5671r/.
This article discusses Justice Alito's upbringing and early school years.
3
http://whigclio.princeton.edu/history/. History of the American Whig Cliosophic
Society. The American Whig-Cliosophic Society is the oldest college literary and
debating club in the United States. Originally two separate groups, Whig and Clio (as
they have been known commonly for most of their history) grew out of two earlier
student societies, the Plain Dealing Club (Whig) and the Well Meaning Club (Clio),
2

2

Alito was also a member of the Concerned Alwnni of Princeton (CAP), a conservative
group formed in 1972. It is said that the primary purpose of CAP was to oppose
Princeton's decisions regarding affirmative action, as well as limit the number of women
who attended Princeton. Justice Ali to's association with CAP would come back to haunt
4

him while awaiting confirmation on his nomination to the Supreme Court. Justice Alito
graduated from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs with a Bachelor of Arts in 1972. In his yearbook, Justice Alito left a
message stating that he had hoped to one day be a member of the Supreme Court. 5
Also during his time at Princeton, Justice Alito received a low lottery number in
the Selective Service draft. To avoid being drafted immediately, Justice Alito joined
6

Princeton's Reserve Officers' Training Corps instead. Justice Alito would go on to be
commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Signal Corps after graduating
from Princeton and was assigned to the United States Army Reserve. After graduating

founded about 1765 to promote literary and debating activities. Similar groups had
appeared in other American colleges during the eighteenth century; most of them had
been short-lived. Such was the fate of the Plain Dealing and Well Meaning Clubs;
conflicts between the two groups led to their suppression in March 1769.
4
Joe Conason, Alita's Ugly Association, Salon (January 13, 2006, 2:00PM),
http://www.salon.com/2006/01/13/alito_controversy/.
This article described Justice Alito's association with Concerned Alumni of Princeton.
Having been categorized as a racist grou many criticized Alito's involvement with
CAP. Justice Alito included his me e,~ s i~e .organization on a job application he filled
nlistratlon. However, no other CAP files were
out in 1985 to work for the Reagan
found tying Alito to CAP.
5
Alito has a record of steady conservatism, reputation for civility, Chicago Tribune
(October 31, 2005),
http://www .mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/politics/13 046683 .htm.
6
Alito Joined ROTC While at Princeton, The Washington Post (November 3, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/02/AR200511 0202722.h
tml.

3

from Yale Law, Justice Alito served on activity duty until in 1975, then on inactive duty
until he was honorably discharged in 1980.
After graduating from Princeton in 1972, Justice Alito was admitted into Yale
Law School where he graduated in 197 5. At Yale, Justice Alito was the editor of the Yale
law Journal. 7 Following law school, Justice Alito would go on to clerk for Third Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Leonard I. Garth in 1976 and 1977 in Newark, New Jersey. From
!.

1977 to 1981, Alito was the Assistant United States District Attorney in New Jersey.
!

Following that position, Justice Alito became the Assistant to Solicitor General Rex E.
Lee from 1981 to 1985, arguing a dozen cases before the Supreme Court of the United
States. Following his position as the Assistant Solicitor General, Justice Alito became the
Deputy Assistant to Attorney General Edwin Meese from 1985-1987. Thereafter, Justice
Alito would become the United States Attorney for the District ofNew Jersey from 1987
until he was nominated to become a Court of Appeals Judge by President H.W. Bush in
1990. 8
Having been rated as "well qualified" by the American Bar Association, Justice
Alito was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on April27, 1990 to serve as a judge in
the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 As a Third Circuit judge, Justice Alito

7

Samuel A. Alito's Note, The Yale Law Journal (August 31, 2005),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-joumal-pocket-partlsupreme-courtlsamuela.-alito's-note/.
8
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_ courtljustices/alito.html
9
Joel Roberts, Alito Sworn in as High Court Justice (January 31, 2006, 8:56AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/0 1/31/politics/main1260362.shtml.

4

wrote noteworthy opinions dealing with First

10

,

Fourth 11

12

,

and Eighth Amendment

issues, as well as civil rights issues. 13
During his time serving on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito was also able to spend
time as an adjunct professor at Seton Hall Law from 1999 to 2004. While at Seton Hall
Law, Justice Alito taught courses in Constitutional Law and a course on terrorism and
civil liberties. After Justice Alito left his position as a Third Circuit Court of Appeals
judge and adjunct professor for a seat on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Alito
;

:

came back to Seton Hall Law in 2007 to deliver a commencement speech for the
graduating class.
Of the nine Supreme Court Justices, Justice Alito is still considered to be
relatively new to the bench. Only Sonia Sotomayor (2009) and Elena Kagan (20 10) have
shorter current tenures as Justices. On October 31, 2005, Justice Alito was nominated by
10

Saxe v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001), Justice Alito
wrote the majority opinion holding that a public school district's anti-harassment policy
was unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore violated First Amendment guarantees of
free speech. Alito's opinion stated, "No court or legislature has ever suggested that
unwelcome speech directed at another's 'values' may be prohibited under the rubric of
anti -discrimination."
11
Doe v. Groody, 361 F .3d 232 (3d Cir. 2004), majority held that a strip search of a
mother and daughter located in a home to be searched according to a properly executed
search warrant, but were not criminal suspects named in the warrant, was
unconstitutional. Alito, dissenting, argued that qualified immunity should have protected
police officers from a finding of having violated constitutional rights when they stripsearched the mother and her daughter.
12
Strip-Searcll.GreaLikelyTopicatAlitoHearing,FoxNews(November 28, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/11/28/strip-search-case-likely-topic-at-alitohearing/.
Justice Alito's opinion drew much criticism from Democrats opposing his nomination to
the Supreme Court for being an "extremist."
13
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003), Justice Alito wrote the majority
opinion granting a writ of habeas corpus to a black state prisoner after state courts had
refused to consider the testimony of a witness who stated that a juror had uttered
derogatory remarks about blacks during an encounter in the courthouse after the
conclusion of the trial.

5

President George W. Bush to take over for retiring justice, Sandra Day O'Connor. 14
However, Justice Alito was not President Bush's first or even second choice to be
O'Connor's replacement. Originally, current Chief Justice John Roberts was nominated
to fill the vacancy to be left by O'Connor. Due to the sudden death of then Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, President Bush withdrew Roberts' nomination to fill O'Connor's seat
and nominated Roberts to fill Chief Justice Rehnquist's seat. President Bush then
nomipated Harriet Miers to replace 0' Connor. Miers would ~ithdraw her nomination
.

i

after receiving widespread criticism from conservatives. After Miers withdrew her
nomination, Justice Alito was finally nominated. Justice Alito's nomination was met with
opposition from many Democratic Senators, who characterized Alito as being a "hardright conservative." 15 During his confirmation hearing, Justice Alito was asked about his
past association with the Conservative Alumni of Princeton, as well as his stance on
abortion. 16 The American Civil Liberties Union also formally opposed Justice Alito's
nomination. Nonetheless, the Senate confirmed Justice Alito on January 31,2006 by a
vote of 58-42. 17 Justice Alito became the 11 Oth Justice to serve on the Court, as well as
the 11th Catholic and only the second Italian-American to serve.

Justice A lito's jurisprudential approach
14

Bush Picks Appeals Court Judge to Succeed O'Connor on Court, The New York Times
(October 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/1 0/31/politics/politicsspeciall/31 cndcourt.html?ex=1136955600&en=7f7e8f24c9ed7674&ei=5070& r=1&.
This article describes the course of events that took place leading to Justice Ali to being
nominated to the Supreme Court.
15
There Will Be No One to the Right of Sam Alito, (October 31, 2005, 8:17AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2005/1 0/3112381/alito-turley/.
16
Jane Roh, Dems Slam Alito's Alumni Group, Fox News (January 12, 2006),
http://www .foxnews.com/story/2006/01/12/dems-slam-alito-alumni -group/.
17
David Welna, Alito Confirmed as Newest Supreme Court Justice, National Public
Radio (January 31, 2006, 6:22 PM),
http://www .npr.org/templates/story/story. php ?storyId=5181 091.
6

Justice Alito is well known for his conservative stance on issues. He is one of the
most conservative Justices on the court alongside Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts.
According to a U.S. News article, as of2008, Justice Alito had voted conservative on
Supreme Court issues 74% of the time.

18

He is sometimes referred to by the nickname

"Scalito" in reference to similarities to Justice Scalia's conservative views and Italian
roots. 19 However, Alito has also been described as having "a substantial libertarian
dimension to his jurisprudence as well as a conservative one." 20 In his first term serving
;

;

as Supreme Court Justice, three cases had to be reargued since Justice Alito was to be the
deciding vote. In each of those three cases, Justice Alito voted with the four other
conservative Justices in order to break the tie. The three cases were Garcetti v.

Ceballos21 , Hudson v. Michigan 22, and Kansas v. Marsh.

18

23

Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court Justices, US News (May 12,
2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/05/12/ranking-the-politicsof-supreme-court-justices.
This article describes voting tendencies of the Supreme Court Justices.
19
Vaughn Ververs, You Say Scalito, I Say Alito, CBS News (November 1, 2005, 11:35
AM) http://www.cbsnews.com/830 1-500486_162-999542-500486.html
20
Ilya Somin, Alito's Libertarian Streak, CATO Institute (November 10, 2005),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/alitos-libertarian-streak
21
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Court held that a violation of the
"knock-and-announce" rule by police does not require the suppression of the evidence
found during a search.
22
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that statements made by
public employees pursuant to their official duties are not protected by the First
Amendment from employer discipline.
23
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did
not prohibit states from imposing the death penalty when mitigating and aggressive
sentencing factors were in equipoise.

7

In a 2012, the New York Court Watcher published an article articulating each
Justices voting patterns on various topics? 4 When it comes to highly partisan-charged
cases, Justice Alito votes like a conservative Republican politician 92% of the time.
When it comes to more ideological voting patterns, Justice Alito votes conservative 88%
of the time. Finally, when it comes to levels of judicial activism, Justice Alito votes for
activism (to· invalidate a law) nearly 63% of the time instead of voting for restraint and
deferring t~ lawmakers.
'

Analysis of Justice Alito 's opinions
This paper will further analyze ten opinions written by Justice Alito, including 3
majority opinions, three concurring opinions, and four dissenting opinions.

Analysis of Majority Opinions
The first majority opinion written by Justice Alito is Davis v. Federal Electronics
Commission. 25 In Davis, the Court held that §319(a) 26 and (b) 27 of the Bipartisan

24

Part 7: Focus on Justice Alito, New York Court Watcher (May 25, 2012),
http://www.newyorkcourtwatcher.com/2012/05/part-7-focus-on-justice-alitosupreme.html.
This article breaks down Justice Alito's voting records.
25
554 U.S. 724 (2008)
26
§319(a) is also known as the "Millionaire's Amendment," which provides that when a
candidates expenditure of personal funds exceeds $350,000 (known as the Opposition
Personal Funds Amount), a new regulatory scheme comes into play. The non-selffinancing candidate will now be able to receive individual contributions at treble the
normal limit of $2,300, and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit.
27
§319(b) requires candidates to make three types of disclosures in order to calculate the
OPFA: a declaration of intent revealing the amount of personal funds the candidate
intends to spend in excess of $350,000, an "initial notification" within 24 hours of
exceeding $350,000 mark, and an additional notification within 24 hours of making or
becoming obligated to make each addition~_..expenditure of $10,000 or more using
personal funds. Notifications must provide~e amount of each expenditure and must be
filed with the Federal Election Commission. Candidate will be subject to civil and
criminal penalties for failure to comply.

8

Campaign Reform Act28 are unconstitutional because they are a violation of the First
Amendment right to spend one's own money to advocate for one's own election. First,
Justice Alito's opinion looked to determine whether or not Davis had standing to invoke
federal jurisdiction. "To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant's
challenged behavior' and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling." The majority
stated that Da~is did have standing to challenge §319(b). Since Davis ~as forced to file a
.

'

§319 (b) disclosure statement, a finding that §319(b) is unconstitutional would have
spared him from making those disclosures and from being threatened with an
enforcement action by the FEC. However, the majority further noted that just because
Davis has standing to challenge §319 (b), it does not necessarily follow that he has
standing to challenge §319(a). The FEC argued that Davis lacked standing to attack the
constitutionality of §319(a) because he suffered no injury, since his opponent had not
qualified for asymmetrical limits. The majority rejected FEC's argument, holding that the
injury required for standing need not be actualized. A party has standing to sue where the
threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct. The majority held that since Davis had
declared his intent to spend at least $350,000 of his own money, he was faced with the
threat of injury when his opponent was then allowed to receive contributions on more
favorable terms. Further, the majority held that even though the election was over, the
issues were not moot because the disputes were capable of being repeated.
After determining that Davis did have standing, Justice Alito then turned to the
merits of Davis' claim that the First Amendment was violated by the contribution limits
28

The BCRA is a United States federal law that amended the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, which regulates the fmancing of political campaigns.

9

imposed by §319(a). Justice Alito noted that for the campaign finance limitations to be
constitutional, they must apply equally to all candidates and must be justified by
important governmental interests. First, Justice Alito stated that §319 (a) requires a
candidate to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered political
speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limits. As a result, a candidate using
personal funds to finance his campaign produces fundraising advantages for his
opponent, thus imposing a substantial burden on the self-financing candidate. As §319(a)
;

!

imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal
funds for campaign speech, Justice Alito stated that the provision couldn't stand unless it
is justified by a compelling state interest. The FEC argued that the compelling state

interest~ furthered by §319(a) is the elimination of corruption or the perception of
corruption. The majority rejected the FEC's anti-corruption argument, stating that since
the statute gave liberalized limits for non-self-financing candidates, it doesn't make sense
that the denial of liberalized limits to self-financing candidates can be regarded as serving
anti-corruption goals sufficiently to justify the resulting constitutional burden.
The FEC also argued that the §319(a)'s asymmetrical limits are justified because
they essentially level the playing field between wealthy individuals and candidates who
are not as wealthy. The majority stated in response to this argument that "the concept that
government restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." !d., at 12.
Finally, the majority discussed the remaining issue as to the constitutionality of

§319(b)' s disclosure requirements. The majority stated that there must be a relevant
correlation or substantial relation between the governmental interest and the information

10

required to be disclosed in order for the disclosure requirements to pass constitutional
muster. The strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the
actual burden on First Amendment rights. The majority found that since §319(b)' s
disclosure requirements were designed to implement asymmetrical contribution limits
provided for in §319(a), now determined to be unconstitutional, the requirements of
§319(b) cannot be justified and it follows that they too are unconstitutional. The majority
held that the judgment of the District Court be reversed, and the case remanded for
;

!

further proceedings.
The second majority opinion written by Justice Alito is National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), et al. v. Nelson, et al. 29 In NASA, the majority held that
NASA's background checks of contract employees do not violate any constitutional
privacy right. 30 The basic facts are as follows: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a
NASA facility that is operated by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), was
subject to the requirement of background checks since JPL were staffed by contract
employees. The respondents here, employees of JPL argued that the background checks
violated a constitutional right to informational privacy and sued NASA, Caltech, and the
Department of Commerce. The circuit court held that portions of the background-check
forms were likely unconstitutional, particularly the parts requiring disclosure of drug
treatment or counseling, as well as questions concerning an employees fmancial integrity
and mental stability because they were not narrowly tailored to meet the Government's
interests.
29

131 S.Ct. 746 (2011).
In 2004, President George W. Bush issued a directive requiring federal contract
employees, with long-term access to federal facilities, to undergo background
investigations.
30

11

In an 8-0 decision, the Supreme Court did not definitively state whether a
constitutional privacy right exists. 31 However, as they have done in two previous cases,
the Supreme Court hinted that such a right might exist, and assuming it does, ruled that
the background checks do not violate such a right.

32

First, the Court noted that the

questions challenged by the respondents are part of a standard employment background
check of the sort used by millions of private employers. The only reason this situation
arose was because of the requirement that federal contract employees, with long-term
:
;
access to federal facilities, were now required to submit to background checks, when they
never were before. The Court noted that the Government has always had an interest in
conducting basic employment background checks. The fact that Cal Tech was the direct
employer makes no difference about the government's interest in this case, as JPL was
operating under a Government contract.
After establishing that the Government has an interest in administering
background checks, the Court explained that the portions of the forms in question
consisted of reasonable, employment-related inquiries that further the Government's
interests in managing its internal operations. Justice Alito stated that the question asking
employees about recent drug use is not irrelevant as the "Government is entitled to have
its projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding persons who will efficiently and effectively
discharge their duties." 33 Justice Alito further stated that the follow-up questions
regarding treatment and counseling is also reasonable as the Government uses those
questions to separate out the drug users who have taken steps to address and overcome
31

Justice Kagan did not take part in the consideration or the decision of this case.
Court took this approach in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) and Nixon v. General
Services Administration, 433 U.S 425 (1977).
33
NASA at 10
32

12

their problems. Treatment, Alito states, is a mitigating factor that the Government uses to
determining whether to grant contract employees long-term access to federal facilities.
Also as to the issue of Governmental interest, the Court's opinion notes that the
Government does not have the burden of demonstrating that the questions asked are
"necessary" or the "least restrictive means" used to obtain the information. When the
Government acts as a manager of its internal affairs, it only needs to show a "reasonable
interest" in obtaining the inform,ation.
As to the issue of whether the broad, open-ended questions violated respondents'
informational-privacy rights, Justice Alito writes that the questions in this case are
reasonably aimed to identify and separate strong candidates from the weaker candidates.
The reasonableness of the open-ended questions is illustrated by their "pervasiveness in
the public and private sector as the use of open-ended questions in employment
background checks appears to be equally commonplace in both the private and public
sector."34 Furthermore, any information obtained by the Government is protected from
disclosure to the public under the Privacy Act. 35 Although Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas tend to be in agreement on most issues, Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote their
own, separate concurring opinions. Both Justices stated that the issue of a constitutional
right to informational privacy should have been decided, and both believed it should have
been decided in the negative.

34

NASA at 11.
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, requires written consent before the
Government may disclose records pertaining to any individual §552a(b). The Act also
imposes criminal liability for willful violations of its nondisclosure
obligations.§552a(i)(1 ).
35

13

The third and final majority opinion written by Justice Alito is Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable School Committee, et al.36 The Supreme Court held in Fitzgerald that parents
could sue a school committee under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
In doing so, the Supreme Court stated that Title IX37 does not preclude a 42 U.S.C. §1983
action alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.

38

A quick summary of the facts is as follows: Jacqueline Fitzgerald was a
kindergartener in the Barnstable Sch9ol District. On separate occasions, a third-grade boy
bullied Jacqueline. The first time, Jacqueline was bullied on the school bus. The second
time, she was bullied in the classroom. The boy would bully Jacqueline into lifting up her
skirt, pull down her underpants, and spread her legs. After the initial incident, the school
set up a meeting between the parents, the school principal, and another school official.
The alleged bully, the bus driver, and several students were also questioned, but the
school could not corroborate Jacqueline's story. After the second incident occurred,
another meeting was set up with Jacqueline's parents, but the school determined there
was insufficient evidence to warrant discipline. The local police department also
conducted their own investigation, but also found that there was insufficient evidence to
bring criminal charges. The school principal did suggest remedial measures to the
36

555 U.S. 246 (2009).
Title IX is a portion of the Equal Opportunity in Education Act, which states that "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. §1681(a).
37

38

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in relevant part "Every person who ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."

14

Fitzgeralds, which were rejected because the Fitzgeralds felt that the proposals were
punishing their daughter (having her transfer busses). The Fitzgeralds requested that the
school transfer the boy instead or place a monitor on the bus, but the school never acted
on their requests. The Fitzgeralds began to drive their daughter to school instead, but the
boy continued to bully Jacqueline at school, all of which were reported to the school.
Finally, the Fitzgeralds filed suit, alleging that the school system's response to their
allegations of sexual harassment had be~n inadequate. They claimed a violation of Title
IX against the Barnstable School Committee and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The school committee filed a motion for summary judgment on the Title IX
claim, which was granted by the District Court. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's decision and held that Title IX precluded § 1983 claims
based on equal protection. The Court of Appeals characterized Title IX' s implied private
remedy as "sufficiently comprehensive to preclude use of§ 1983 to advance statutory
claims based on Title IX itself." !d. at 5. The Court of Appeals believes that according to
Congress, Title IX was the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free
from gender discrimination perpetrated by educational institutions. The United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Justice Alito's opinion states that when determining whether a subsequent statute
precludes the enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, the Court places primary
emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute's remedial scheme, as well as Congress'
legislative intent. Justice Alito states that Title IX has no administration exhaustion
requirement and no notice provisions like other statutes have. Justice Alito also

15

recognized an implied right of action on behalf of the plaintiffs, which allows them to file
directly in court and be eligible to obtain the full range of remedies. As a result, parallel
and concurrent § 1983 claims will neither circumvent required procedures nor allow
access to new remedies. Justice Alito goes on to also note that Title IX does not express a
private means of redress, which leads the Court to believe that Congress did not intend to
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for substantial equal protection claim.
Finally, Justice Alito compares the

~ubstantive

rights and protections guaranteed

under Title IX and under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Alito concluded that that
Congress did not intend Title IX to preclude§ 1983 constitutional suits because Title IX's
protections are narrower in some aspects, and broader in others. Justice Alito notes that
Title IX has been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and
other individuals, whereas § 1983 equal protection claims may be brought against
individuals as well as municipalities and other state entities. The opinion also goes on to
list several activities that may be challenged on constitutional grounds, but Title IX
exempts from its restrictions, thus making them not actionable under Title IX.
Furthermore, even when ~an activity is subject to both Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause, Justice Alito explains that the standards for establishing liability may
not be wholly congruent. Therefore, the Court concluded that Title IX was not meant to
be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools or a
substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional rights. The Court held
that § 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to the Fitzgeralds
alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.

Analysis of Concurring Opinions

16

The first of Justice Alito's concurring opinions to be analyzed is a Fourth
Amendment case dealing with the issue of what constitutes a search. In United States v.
Jones 39, the Supreme Court held that installing a Global Positioning System tracking
device on an automobile in order to monitor the car's movements did in fact constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment.
In this case, the police suspected respondent Antoine Jones of various narcotics
violations. The police obtained a warrant to atlfich GPS tracking device to the underside
'

of defendant's car. However, the warrant was applied for in the District of Columbia and
to be installed within 10 days. On the 11th day, the GPS was installed in Maryland, not in
the District of Columbia as the warrant stated. The police then continued to monitor the
vehicle for 24 hours a day for 28 days after installing the device. The device gathered
more than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-week period. The government was able to
gather enough information from the GPS device to bring a multiple-count indictment
against Jones, ultimately finding him guilty on conspiracy to distribute and to possession
with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more grams of
cocaine base. Jones argued that the installation of the GPS device constituted an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia overturned his conviction based on a finding that the installation of
the GPS device was a search because it violated Jones' reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the installation of the GPS
device without a warrant violates Jones' Fourth Amendment rights. All nine justices

39

132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)

17

voted unanimously that it did in fact violate Jones' Fourth Amendment right, but they did
not agree on the reasoning. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the
installation of the GPS device constituted a trespass on private property and thus violated
Jones' right to be free from an unreasonable search. Justice Alito, in his concurring
opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, felt that the GPS
device violated Jones' "reasonable expectation of privacy," and thus constituted a search.
The majority stated that when determining 'ihether a "search" had occurred under
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the appropriate inquiry is whether or not a
trespass or physical intrusion of private property had occurred. Although Justice Scalia
acknowledged that in Katz the Court used the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
approach to determine whether or not there was a search, he also argued that numerous
post-Katz cases used the "trespass" inquiry to determine whether a search had occurred.
40

Justice Scalia believes that the Fourth Amendment provides more than one level of

protection. The initial inquiry should be that of trespass, and then, if there was no
trespass, whether or not the defendant has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." In this
case, since the majority feels that the installation of the GPS device was a trespass, there
is no need to determine any further whether Jones' reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated.
The nickname "Scalito" refers to Justice Ali to's similarities in his views with
Justice Scalia. Although they both agree in the holding of this case, they take very
different approaches in reaching their decision. Justice Alito did not believe that trespass

°
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)- In Katz, the Court held that individuals
with a "reasonable expectation of privacy" are protected from unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
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was the proper inquiry in a case where the issue is a GPS device. Justice Alito believes
that in a case where an electronic device was used, Katz 's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test should be the appropriate inquiry.
Justice A lito explained in detail the history ofF ourth Amendment search
analyses. Before Katz, cases in which there was no trespass, it was held that there was no
search. Katz finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not
required for a Fourth Amendment violation. 41 Even th?ugh the means used by the police
to listen in on phone conversations did not physically intrude on the area occupied by the
defendant, the Court held that an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish a constitutional violation. Justice Alito cites to the Court's decision in Oliver v.

United States 42 , where the Court found there to be a trespass, but not a Fourth
Amendment Violation. In Oliver, the Court wrote, "The existence of a property right is
but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. The
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited."
Justice Alito's opinion also points to flaws in the majority's reasoning. He
believes the majority's reliance on trespass will lead to incongruous results based on the
type of surveillance used (attaching a device for a short period of time is unconstitutional,
but following the same car for a much longer period of time using unmarked cars would
not be), may be difficult to apply in certain states (community property states), and cause
problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, but not
41

Katz involved the use of a listening device that was attached to the outside of a public
telephone booth and that allowed police officers to eavesdrop on one end to the phone
conversation.
42
466 U.S. 170 (1984)
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physical, contact with the item being tracked. Justice Alito believes the Katz-based
expectation of privacy test allows the Court to circumvent those problems, while also
being able to adapt to society's ever changing expectations of privacy. "The availability
and use of... new devices will continue to shape the average person's expectations about
the privacy of his or her daily movements."
The second concurring opinion to be discussed is Justice Alito's opinion in
~alazar v. Buono. 43 Salazar dealt with the issue of a cross, that was placed on federal
;

.

ground as a war memorial. The memorial cross, having been located at the Mojave
National Preserve since 1934, was ordered to be taken down after a District Court found
that the location of the cross on federal ground violated the Establishment Clause. 44 In
order to comply with the District Court's permanent injunction, while not offending war
veterans, Congress passed a land exchange agreement in which an acre of land containing
the cross was conveyed to the VFW in consideration for 5 acres of land. This way the
location of the cross would no longer be on federal land.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding that the
land exchange transfer was an attempt to evade the permanent injunction and therefore
invalid, and also affmned the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

43

559 U.S. 700 (2010)
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making
any law "respecting an establishment of religion." This clause not only forbids the
government from establishing an official religion, but also prohibits government actions
that unduly favor one religion over another. It also prohibits the government from unduly
preferring religion over non-religion, or non-religion over religion.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause
44
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In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found that the cross may stay, but remanded
the case for further proceedings. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ali to in part, held that the District Court erred
in ordering an injunction and removal of the cross. Justice Kennedy's opinion states that
a court must consider all of the circumstances bearing on the need for preventive relief
before ordering an injunction. In regard to the land transfer statute, Justice Kennedy
believes that the District Court failed to consider the context in which the land transfer
!

i

statute was enacted. In ordering the case to be remanded, the plurality concluded that the
District Court should conduct a proper inquiry into the necessity for injunctive relief in
light of the land transfer statute.
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, wrote his own concurring opinion.
Justice Alito wrote that he agreed with Justice Kennedy's opinion except that he would
not remand the case for the lower courts to decide whether implementation of the land
transfer statute would violate the District Court's injunction or the Establishment Clause.
Justice Alito believes that the facts have been sufficiently developed to allow the
Supreme Court to decide the case, concluding that the statute may be implemented.
Justice Alito notes that the District Court did not take into account the context in which
the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage. Alito writes that the purpose of
the cross was not to promote a Christian message, but to honor fallen soldiers. Thus, the
Government was caught in a dilemma- either remove the cross and risk offending the
veterans who fought for our country, or risk a violation of the Constitution. Therefore,
Congress passed the land-transfer statute. Justice Alito states that Congress chose the
land-transfer statute as an "alternative approach designed to eliminate any perception of
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religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally owned land,
while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism associated with the destruction
of the monument." Justice Alito also agrees with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion that
the meaning of the injunction was that the Government could not allow the cross to
remain on federal land, a problem solved by the land-transfer statute.
Finally, Justice Alito addresses the dissents ;ofnt that implementing the statute
would ~onstitute an endorsement of Christianity and therefore v,iolate the Establishment
i

;

Clause. Using the "endorsement test," Justice Alito notes that an observer familiar with
the origin and history of the monument would also know that the monument is located on
privately owned property, and the owner has no obligation to preserve the monument's
present design. Thus, as Justice Alito believes, a reasonable observer would appreciate
the fact the Congress was trying to find an accommodating solution to a difficult
situation.
The final concurring opinion written by Justice Alito to be discussed is Crawford

v. Metropolitan Government ofNashville. 45 By unanimous decision, the Court held that
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protects an employee from unlawful sexual
harassment even though the harassed employees did not report the harassment
themselves. The Court found that as long as an employee cooperated with an
investigation of the alleged misconduct, he or she is still protected under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.
Vicky Crawford had been working for Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County for nearly 30 years. In 2002, the department of human resources began

45
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us 271 (2009)
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to investigate Dr. Gene Hughes, an employee relations director working for the Metro
School District, after several woman had complained that Dr. Hughes had sexually
harassed them. Since Crawford had worked closely with Dr. Hughes, she was questioned
during the investigation. Crawford described several occasions where Dr. Hughes
sexually harassed her. However, because there were no witnesses to Crawford's, or any
of the other women's allegations, no disciplinary action was taken against Dr. Hughes.
However,

~tll

of the women, including Crawford, who responded th~t Hughes had

sexually harassed them, were fired. After being fired, Crawford sued her former
employer under Title VII. 46 The District Court held that Title VII did not protect
Crawford because she did not oppose the illegal conduct, she was only responding to an
investigation. The Court also held that Crawford was not protected against retaliation for
her dismissal because her employer initiated the investigation and a charge had not been
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission until after she had been
terminated. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of the word "oppose" in the statute. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the word
"oppose" to mean an active or consistent opposition to the behavior being complained of.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court found that since Crawford did not initiate the investigation,
she did not "oppose" the behavior. The majority however, held that since the word
"oppose" is not defined anywhere in the statue, that it carries its ordinary dictionary

46

Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by covered employers
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
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meaning. 47 Thus, the word "oppose" goes beyond active behavior and applies to a
situation where someone has not taken any action to advance a position besides merely
disclosing it. The Court found that one may "oppose" behavior just by responding to
someone else's question rather than initiating a complaint. Metro argued for the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of the word "oppose," stating that employers will be less likely to
raise questions about possible discrimination if an employee can easily raise a retaliation
charge if things go badly for the employee. The majority rejected Metro's argument as
:

~

being inconsistent with the statute's primary objective of avoiding harm to employees,
and would undermine the Faragher-Ellerth scheme. 48 The Court held that if an employee
who reported discrimination only by responding to an employer's questions could be
penalized without remedy, then employees would have a good reason not to report the
discrimination at all.
Justice Alito wrote his own concurring opinion, joined in by Justice Thomas.
Justice Alito notes that although he agrees with the majority's primary reasoning, he
wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's holding "does not and should not extend
beyond employees who testify in internal investigations or engage in analogous

47

The Court in Crawford used the definition according to Webster's New International
Dictionary 171 0 (2d ed.195 8)- "to resist or antagonize ... ; to contend against; to confront;
resist; withstand."
48
The Faragher-Ellerth scheme is a defense created from the following cases: Faragher
v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998). The Faragher-Ellerth Defense is an affirmative defense employers may
use to defend against claims of hostile work environment harassment by supervisors or
their superiors. Employers may attempt to use the defense if: 1. No tangible adverse
employment action was taken against the plaintiff, 2. The employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and promptly correct the harassing behavior, or 3. The plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.
24

purposive conduct."

49

Justice Alito disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation that

"opposition" must be consistent and initiated by the employee, but stating that it must be
"active and purposive." Justice Alito recognized that the majority's definition of oppose
could also consist of "silent" opposition, which may be problematic since it is
questionable whether that is protected as well. Justice Alito has a "slippery slope" type
concern in allowing "silent" opposition, stating that protecting conduct that is silent may
"open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a word of
~

!

opposition to their employers. "50 Of particular concern to Justice Ali to is the "water
cooler hypothetical" where an employee may have expressed opposition to sexual
harassment in a private conversation, say at the water cooler or in a private phone call.
Justice Alito feels this would lead to uncertainty regarding the time when the employer
became aware of the employer's private expression of opposition. Finally, Justice Alito
noted that Equal Employment Opportunity Commission retaliation charges doubled
between 1992 and 2007 and fears that expanding the interpreted protected opposition
conduct would likely cause this trend to accelerate further.

Analysis of Dissenting Opinions
The first of Justice Alito's dissenting opinions to be analyzed is Florida v.

Jardines. 51 Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy and Breyer, joined Justice
Alito's dissent. Traditionally, these four justices do not take similar stands on the same
issue and dissent together. The majority held that a search of the immediate surroundings
of a home, through the use of a trained police dog, is a "search" within the meaning of the
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Crawford at 6.
ld at 7.
51
133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013)
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Fourth Amendment. Thus, absent consent, the search would require probable cause and a
search warrant.
In reaching its decision, the majority focused on the important of homeowner's
property rights as opposed to their privacy rights. Following the precedent set in United
States v. Jones, discussed above, the majority notes that when there is a physical intrusion

by police onto a persons home for the purpose of obtaining information, a search has
occurred. The majority discusses the protection of the home as being a core value of the
~

i

Fourth Amendment. Even though a visitor coming onto one's property has the right to
approach the door, knock, wait for an answer and then leave, a visitor does not have an
invitation to linger on the property or peer into the home. A visitor is not implicitly
licensed by the homeowner to linger, and such behavior constitutes a trespass. Thus,
bringing a trained police dog up to the door of a home to identify smells of illegal
substances constitutes an unreasonable search without a warrant.
Justice Alito vehemently disagrees with the majority's analysis, arguing that their
decision is based on a "putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the
annals of Anglo-Americanjurisprudence." 52 Justice Alito argues that the law of trespass
gives members of the public a license to use the walkway to approach the front door of a
house and remain there for a brief time, just as the officers in this case did. The license,
Alito states, is not limited to people who intend to speak to the homeowner, but extends
to solicitors, mail carriers, and police officers who wish to gather evidence. A visitor is
not required to ring the doorbell. Justice Alito disagrees that a trespass occurred here just
because a trained police dog accompanied the officer, noting that the majority could not
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Jar dines at 9.
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find a single case to support their conclusion. Justice Alito notes that there are restrictions
on a visitor's course of conduct: the visitor must conform to conduct that would be
reasonably expected from a visitor. A visitor would be expected to stick to a path or
paved walkway; a visitor would be expected to refrain from wandering into the backyard
or looking through bushes, or coming to the front door in the middle of the night. Further,
the license to approach the home is limited to the amount of time it would customarily
take to approach, pause l~ng enough to ~ someone is home, and then leave. Jusrice
Ali to also discusses the implied right to approach with regard to police officers. Police
officers do not engage in a search when they "approach the front door of a residence and
seek to engage in what is termed a 'knock and talk." 53 Even when the objective of a
"knock and talk" is to obtain evidence, Justice Alito argues that the license to approach
still applies. With regards to the conduct of the officer in this case, Justice Alito believes
the officer did not exceed the scope of the license to approach. Ali to notes the officer
adhered to the customary path, approached at a reasonable hour, and remained at the front
door for less than a minute or two.
The majority felt that the officer went too far in approaching the home because he
had the objective purpose of conducting a search; Justice Alito disagrees. Based on this
rationale, Justice Ali to argues that any standard "knock and talk" would not be
f;JJ

considered a search. Justice Alito notes that police almost always

approac~ome

with the

purpose of discovering information, which is the basic purpose of a "knock and talk."
The majority contends that a "knock and talk" is different because it involves talking,
which all are invited to do. Justice Alito counters this point by mentioning that even when

53

!d. at 11.
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officer's conduct a "knock and talk," they may still observe items in plain view and smell
odors coming from the home.
Justice Alito also believes that the majority's decision fails under the "reasonable
expectation of privacy test," because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for
odors emanating from the home. Justice Alito declares that he would not draw a line
between odors that can be smelled by a dog, but not by a human. The majority compared
the use of a dog to the use o~ a thermal imaging device in Kyollo v. United States. 54
~

.
t

However, Justice Alito argues that a dog is not a new form of technology like the thermal
imaging device in Kyollo was. Further, Justice Ali to cites that police have used dogs for
their acute sense of smell for centuries and even notes that under common law, unleashed
dogs were allowed to wander on private property without committing a trespass.
The second of Justice Alito's dissenting opinions comes in United States v.
Alvarez. 55 The majority in Alvarez held that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional

under the First Amendment's free speech protections. 56 The incident at issue occurred
when Xavier Alvarez introduced himself at district board meeting as a retired marine who
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. After it was discovered that Alvarez's
statements were not true, he was indicted for violating the Stolen Valor Act. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court in California's
rejection of Alvarez's claim that the Act was unconstitutional.
54

533 U.S. 27 (2001). The majority in Kyollo held that the use of a thermal imaging
device from a public street to monitor heat radiation emanating from a home was a search
under the Fourth Amendment, requiring a warrant.
55
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
56
Stolen Valor Act made it illegal for unauthorized persons to wear, buy, sell, barter,
trade, or manufacture "any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the armed
forces of the United States, or any of the service medals or badges awarded to the
members of such forces. 120 STAT. 3266
28

The plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor stated that false statements are not excluded from
First Amendment protection just because they are false in nature. The Court has never
found in prior cases that false statements should constitute a new category of unprotected
speech like there is for perjury or threats of violence. Further, the plurality opinion
addressed the breadth of the Act. In particular, Justice Kennedy writes how the Act
applies to a false statement that :is made regardless of the time or place, whether
whispered in the home or made in public. Finally, Justice Kennedy's opinion states that
the Government did not show how the Act's restriction of free speech exceeds the
Government's interest in protecting the integrity of the military honors system.
Restrictions on speech are subject to a strict scrutiny test, which the Government did not
meet. The plurality opinion notes that the difference between this case and unprotected
speech, such as when making a threat, is that these types of false statements alone do not
present a grave and imminent threat.
Justice Breyer wrote the concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan. They
believed that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional under an intermediate scrutiny
test. Basically, the concurring opinion stated that the Act fails under the intermediate
scrutiny test because it applies in situations where no harm is done; that its restriction on
speech is not proportional to the government's interest in protecting false statements.
Justice Alito's dissent, joined by the more usual company of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, recognized that the statute created by Congress could not have been drafted
more narrowly. The statute only reached knowingly false statements made by the
speaker. Further, Justice Alito argues that the majority broke from a long lines of cases
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recognizing that the right to free speech does not protect one who makes false factual
statements that inflict real harm and serve no purpose.
Justice Alito describes five ways in which the statute is narrowly limited. First,
the act only applies to narrow categories of making false statements where the facts can
always be proved or disproved with certainty. Second, the type of speech that Act seeks
to disqualify is squarely within the speaker's control. Third, conviction under the act
requires proof beyond a reasonable

~oubt

that the speaker knew the representation was

i

false. Fourth, the Act only reaches statements that cannot be interpreted as dramatic
performances, satire, parody, hyperbole, or the like. Finally, the Act is strictly viewpoint
neutral, having no ties to any particular political or ideological message. Noting a
growing problem of false claims being made concerning the receipt of military awards,
Congress passed the Stolen Valor Act. Justice Ali to argues that the Act is consistent with
other laws passed by Congress, such 18 U.S.C. §704(a), which makes it a federal offense
for anyone to wear, manufacture, or sell military decorations without authorization. The
Act attempts to prevent those making the misrepresentations from unlawfully obtaining
financial or other material awards, veteran's benefits, and the like. Further, Justice Alito
describes it as a "slap in the face of veterans who have paid their price and earned their
medals." 57
Justice Alito counters the plurality opinion's argument that Congress could have
preserved the integrity of the honors by different means. Alito argues that the alternative,
a public database of all recipients, would not work because the Department of Defense
has explained that it cannot create a database for recipients prior to 2001.

57

Alvarez at 17.
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Next, Justice Alito argues that false factual statements possess no intrinsic First
Amendment value. Alito recognizes that the First Amendment does not protect false
statements consisting of fraud, perjury, and defamation. To support his argument that the
First Amendment does not always protect knowingly false statements, Justice Ali to states
that there are more than 100 federal criminal statues that punish false statements made in
connection with areas of federal agency concern. Although Justice Ali to agreed with
Justice Breyer that in today's world so .called "white lies" are harmless and sometimes
;

useful (such as to prevent embarrassment or protect privacy), he differentiated those
types of lies with the type made unlawful by the Act. He notes that Alvarez's lies served
no lawful purpose, nor did they attempt to prevent an embarrassment or protect one's
privacy. The types of statements made by Alvarez consisted of no intrinsic value, and fail
to serve any instrumental purpose that the First Amendment might protect. Thus,
Alvarez' material misrepresentation should not be protected by the First Amendment.

JD.B. v. North Carolina 58 is the third case to discuss where Justice Alito wrote a
dissenting opinion. This time, more familiar Justices joined Justice Alito: Justices
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas. JD.B. was a case where the Supreme Court found that age
is a relevant factor when determining custody for Miranda purposes. J.D.B. was an
under-age, special education student who was suspected of committing multiple
robberies. A police investigator, a uniformed police officer, and school officials
interrogated J.D.B., where he confessed to the crimes. At no time was J.D.B. informed of
his Miranda rights or given the opportunity to contact his parents. Any attempts during
trial to suppress the confession because Miranda was never given were denied on the
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grounds that J.D.B. was not in police custody. The majority held that J.D.B.'s age should
have been a consideration in determining whether or not he was in police custody and
should have been given his Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the lower court to make a new finding on custody, taking into account J.D.B. 'sage.
The majority found that "To hold, as the State requests, that a child's age is never
relevant to whether a suspect has been taken into custody - and thus to ignore the very
real differences between children and adu,lts - would be to deny children the full scope of
i

the procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees to adults." 59 The majority's main point
was that age is relevant in that it affects how a "reasonable person" in the suspect's
position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. The Court noted that an adult's
judgment and way of thinking is much different than that of a child's. For example, an
adult may be able to determine whether or not they are free to leave from a police
investigation, whereas a child may feel coerced to stay even though they would be free to
leave. The Court discusses that children and adults also differ when it comes to maturity,
behavior, experience, and susceptibility. To emphasize this point further, the majority
cites to various examples where the law limits or disqualifies children from various
activities- such as managing property, entering into a binding contract, and marrying
without parental consent. The Court held that "so long as the child's age is known to the
officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a
reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective
nature of that [Miranda] test. " 60
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Justice Alito's dissenting opinion focused on the majority's holding being
inconsistent with the primary justifications of the Miranda Rule: "the perceived need for
a clear rule that can easily be applied in all cases." Justice Alito notes that the Miranda
rule places a high value on clarity and certainty. A key contributor to this clarity has been
the objective reasonable-person test for determining custody. 61 Justice Alito feels as
though the majority' s decision shifts the Miranda custody determination from a simple,
one-size-fits-all test into an inquiry that now ~ust account for the age of the suspect.
Thus, as was discussed in Justice Ali to's concurring opinion in Crawford, Justice Alito is
concerned with the "slippery-slope" that this decision may cause. Alito notes that age is
not the only personal characteristic that may be correlated with susceptibility to coercive
pressures, and fears that this decision will lead to more characteristics being considered.
Thus, as Justice Alito puts it, the Court's decision will transform the Miranda test from
an easy applied rule into a "highly fact-intensive standard resembling the voluntariness
test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory. 62
Justice Alito notes that historically, the Courts applying this test have focused
solely on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and not the personal
characteristics of the person being interrogated. In fact, Justice Alito further contends that
the totality of the external circumstances, such as the interrogation itself, is what matters
to the Court's whereas personal characteristics of a suspect have consistently been
rejected.

61

The custody analysis considers whether or not a hypothetical person would consider
himself to be confined under the particular circumstances of the situation.
62
!d. at 12
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To counter the majority's reasoning for considering age as a factor, Alito notes
that many people over the age of 18 are also more susceptible to police pressure than the
hypothetical reasonable person. Justice Alito states that Miranda's rigid standard are both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive, but they at least provide one standard for police to
follow. That is why, as Justice Alito puts it, no other Supreme Court case dealing with
Miranda has before mentioned anything to do with age or other personalized

characteristics. Further, if the majority considers age to be a relevant factor, Justice Alito
'

questions how age differs from other factors such as intelligence, cultural background,
education, etc. Justice Alito points out that litigants will soon cite to the majority's
holding for the proposition that other characteristics should be treated like age and taken
into account for purposes of administering Miranda. In the end, Justice Alito feels the
majority's decision today takes the Miranda rule from a simple, clear, and concise test, to
a test that is hard for police to follow and difficult for judges to apply.
The final case to be discussed is Snyder v. Phelps. 63 Just as in Alvarez, discussed
above, Justice Alito again dissents in a First Amendment case. Also like in Alvarez,
Justice Alito believes that the First Amendment should not protect speech that intends to
inflict harm or has no intrinsic value. The Snyder decision received much media attention
and coverage. Albert Snyder, the father of a fallen Marine, brought a suit for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against Fred Phelps and his church, the Westboro Baptist
Church. Phelps and the WBC picketed Snyder's funeral while holding signs condemning
homosexuality. The signs read as such: "You're going to hell", "God hates you", "Fag
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troops", "Semper fi fags", and Thank God for dead soldiers." 64 The WBC also published
an article online denouncing Snyder for raising their son Catholic, which the WBC saw
as "raising him for the devi1." 65 This wasn't the first funeral picketed by the WBC, as
they have done so at numerous funerals across the United States.
In an 8-1 decision, with Justice Alito being the sole dissenter, the Court held that
the WBC could not be liable for emotional distress, regardless of how outrageous the
speech was. The Court reasoned that as long as the sr:eech was on a public sidewalk,
aimed at a public issue, it must receive constitutional protection. The factor the majority
harped on the most was the type of speech at issue. Categorizing the speech as a "matter
of public concern", the majority firmly believes that matters of political, social, or public
concern are entitled to First Amendment protections. The content, form, and context of
the speech are looked at to determine whether the speech is of public matter. To this
regard, the Court notes that most of the signs were not addressed to the Snyder family in
particular. Most of the signs were critical of the United States government, the military,
and homosexuality. The Court further noted that the funeral service itself was not
disturbed, the WBC had conducted its picketing peacefully on public property, and that
Snyder could not hear the WBC's negative speech, nor could he see any more than the
top of the picketer's signs.
Justice Ali to, as the lone dissenter in this case, believed that freedom of speech is
not a license for "vicious verbal assault." Justice Alito does not believe that picketers
may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private people at times of emotional
sensitivity. His basis for this argument is that we allow recovery in tort for the intentional
64
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infliction of emotional distress. Thus, he argues, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form "no essential part of exposition
of ideas ... of slight social value ... that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 66 Justice Alito wholeheartedly believes that when one intentionally inflicts grave injury, the First Amendment
should not interfere with recovery. Justice Alito notes that on the day of the funeral, the
,WBC could have chosen a different location to picket, b~1t they chose Snyder' s funeral in
order to gamer more attention from the media. Thus, any reasonable person Alito argues,
would assume that there was a connection between the messages displayed and Snyder or
that they were directed at Snyder.
Addressing the majority' s rationale that the First Amendment protects the WBC ' s
speech, Alito counters with three different points. First, Alito notes that the First
Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements made on matters of public
concern, and that the WBC' s attack on the Snyder family should be treated the same.
Second, even though the messages were of a public matter, they still attacked the
character of a private figure and should not be protected. Finally, Alito sees no reason
why statements made on a public street, in close proximity to the funeral, should be
regarded as "a free-fire zone in which otherwise actionable verbal attacks are shielded
from liability. " 67 Alito argues that location of the tort is not dispositive. Comparing to a
physical assault, an assailant who was lawfully on the property where the assault occurs
is not a defense of the assault that took place. What seemed to trouble Justice Alito the
most was that the majority's decision allows innocent victims to be harassed and verbally
66
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assaulted during an emotional time where they are grieving the loss of a loved one,
without being able to recover for the infliction of emotional distressed caused to them.
For the final part of this paper, I will discuss my views on how Justice Alito's past
and philosophy have influenced his decisions. Justice Alito has been labeled as a
conservative. His judicial record shows that he votes conservatively on issues, as well as
sides with the other conservative justices a strong majority of the time. During his time at
Pripceton, he was a part of the ultra conservative group, the, Concerned Alumni of
Princeton. Growing up as an Italian-American, Justice Alito held close ties to his family,
community, and his church. Yet, I do not believe "conservative" is the correct label for
Justice Alito. A better-suited label for Justice Alito would be "pragmatist." Every Justice
takes the facts into consideration when rendering an opinion, however I believe Justice
Alito takes it one step further. Instead of just taking the facts as presented to him, Justice
Alito's analysis runs much deeper. His analysis is never just black and white. It takes
into account more than just facts; it considers the context, the environment, and the
situation in which those facts occurred. Justice Alito's opinions also tend to include a
discussion of a ruling's effect well into the future. For example, in Snyder, while the rest
of the Court found that public speech on public property was constitutionally protected
no matter how outrageous, Justice Alito took his analysis in a different direction. His
analysis considered the intentions of the WBC in their speech, as well as the door that
might be opened by the majority's decision. He discussed how the public speech was
purposely aimed at the Snyder family with the intention of causing harm and how the
location was chosen for the sole purpose of amplifying their hateful message. Twice more
we see Justice Alito's analysis take into consideration the future ramifications of his
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decisions. In Crawford and again in J.D. B., Alito takes into consideration the "slippery
slope" effect of his decision. In Crawford, Alito was concerned that allowing "silent"
opposition to be protected conduct in regard to harassment in the workplace, would
"open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a word of
opposition to their employers." 68 Again in J.D.B., we see that in considering whether age
should a factor in administering Miranda warnings, Justice Alito felt that the effect of
doing ,so would lead to other personal characteristics being inc~uded in the analysis in the
~
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future. Thus, the simple and clear Miranda test would then tum into a test that is difficult
to administer.
J.D. B. was not the only time we saw Justice Alito being concerned with changing
a law and the effects that may have. In Jardines, Justice Alito opposed the majority's
analysis using trespass to determine Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, Justice Alito
would have used the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as had been established in
Katz v. United States. 69 Alito noted the negative effects that would result for police
officers attempting to "knock and talk" under the majority's reasoning.
Finally, I feel that the best case to read to get a true understanding of how Justice
Alito analyzes cases would be Salazar v. Buono, the case concerning the cross as a
monument on federal ground. Although the cross was on federal ground, and although I
think everyone realized the land exchange statute was just a ploy to bypass the District
Court's injunction, Justice Alito said it best when discussing the "reasonable person"
standard to decide the case. A reasonable person would have realized the true meaning of
the monument was to honor fallen soldiers of United States, not for the government to
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occurs in the private between two consenting adults, it should not be illegal. That is how
Justice Alito always thought, and continues to do so today.
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